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Reducing the logistics burden is a current focus for 
the Army as it works to develop and field the Objective 
Force.  Increasing reliability is a proven way to achieve 
this goal, with an added benefit of reducing O&S costs and 
increasing the effectiveness of the soldiers. 
Many programs have had difficulty achieving their 
required reliability.  Operational Testing data gathered by 
the Army Test and Evaluation Command indicates a decreasing 
trend in achieving reliability requirements with more than 
80% failing to achieve requirements.  It is intuitive that 
it would be even more difficult to achieve ultra-
reliability, a higher level of reliability and a proposed 
goal of the Future Combat Systems Program.   
 To determine what successful practices should be used 
to achieve reliability requirements, we should look to 
successful programs to show us the way.  To that end, this 
exploratory study questions successful Army programs for 
practices, recommendations, and lessons learned, that could 
be shared with other programs to achieve reliability 
requirements.   
If we are unsuccessful in our endeavors to improve 
reliability achievement, future forces will be 
unnecessarily burdened by our mistakes and incapable of 
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This research focuses on reliability aspects of the 
Future Combat Systems (FCS) and analyzes the strategies 
that were used to achieve it.  This research is applicable 
to other weapon system programs, especially those where the 
goal is to reduce the logistics burden by developing and 
fielding a reliable system. 
B. BACKGOUND 
The U.S. Army, as well as the other services, has been 
plagued with a large logistics burden.  The principle 
logistics burdens are the fuel, ammunition, food, water, 
and spare parts necessary to sustain an operational 
military force.  Because of uncertainties in combat, plans 
for stockpiles of supplies are designed to meet any 
contingency.  As a result, large amounts of supplies and 
logistics personnel are moved into theater to support the 
combat troops and equipment on a just-in-case basis. [Ref. 
1:p. 26]   
It is anticipated, future forces will be called upon 
to be inserted into the combat zone by air, and must be 
prepared to accomplish a numerous variety of combat 
missions, operating for up to 14-days without logistics 
support from outside the battle area.  Because of this 
requirement, future forces and systems must require less 
logistical support than their predecessors. [Ref. 1:p. 27] 
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Reliability is considered a key focus for the 
reduction of the logistics burden.  Reliability is defined 
as the 
probability that an item will perform its 
intended function for a specified interval under 
stated conditions. [Ref. 2:p. 36]  
With more reliable systems, less spares and maintenance 
assets would be required for support, thereby reducing the 
logistics burden. 
The Army is focused on reducing the logistics burden 
of currently fielded systems and future systems under 
development.  One of these, the Future Combat Systems (FCS) 
is a weapon system currently under development as part of 
the Army’s Objective Force.  The FCS may consist of as many 
as five separate robotic systems that interface together 
through a central manned command and control vehicle.  
Because of its autonomous function, the FCS must achieve 
high reliability.  To this end, the Army Science Board 
recommended in a study that the FCS establish ultra-
reliability as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP). 
Many programs have had difficulty achieving their 
required reliability.  It is intuitive that it would be 
even more difficult to achieve ultra-reliability, a higher 
level of reliability.  Operational Testing data gathered by 
the Army Test and Evaluation Command depicts that during 
the period of 1985 to 1990 41% of systems met reliability 
requirements.  This figure worsened to 20% meeting 
reliability requirements during the period of 1996 to 2000.  
Worse yet, those that failed to meet reliability 
requirements also failed to meet even 50% of the 
reliability goals. [Ref. 3] 
Because many programs were unable to achieve 
reliability requirements, LTG Kern, the Military Deputy to 
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the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology, initiated a study to determine 
what should be done to remedy the situation. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.  Primary Research Question 
What strategies should be used to achieve reliability 
requirements for weapon system development? 
2.   Secondary Research Questions 
a.  What is reliability and how does it affect 
total life cycle costs and the logistics burden? 
b.  Why is ultra-reliability a recommended goal 
for the FCS program? 
c.  Should ultra-reliability be a goal of weapon 
system programs? 
d. What is the guidance for achieving 
reliability requirements? 
e. How have successful weapon system programs 
achieved reliability requirements? 
i. How did programs organize to achieve 
reliability requirements? 
ii. How were reliability requirements 
developed? 
iii. What management plans for achieving 
reliability requirements were developed and implemented? 
iv. What processes were used to achieve 
reliability requirements and how was this measured? 
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v. Where in the Acquisition Process was 
the program focused on achievement of reliability 
requirements? 
f.  What are the best strategies that should be 
used for the FCS program as well as other weapon system 
programs? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of the study will include:  (1) an in-depth 
analysis of the logistics burden and the effect of 
reliability upon it; (2) identification and analysis of the 
acquisition lifecycle for reliability inputs; (3) 
identification and interviews of successful programs to 
identify their focus on reliability; (4) review of 
advantages and disadvantages of the approaches used by the 
programs.  The thesis will conclude with a recommendation 
for strategies focusing on improving reliability for the 
Future Combat Systems and other weapon system programs. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology utilized in this thesis research is 
the following: 
1. Conduct a literature search of books, magazine 
articles, CD-ROM systems, and other library information. 
2. Conduct an Internet search of data pertaining to 
the Future Combat Systems, reliability, and reliability 
guidance. 
3. Identify the reliability requirements of the Future 
Combat Systems. 
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4. Utilize Director of Combat Development (DCD), 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Army Test and 
Evaluation Command (ATEC) reliability experts. 
5. Utilize ATEC Operational Test Data to identify 
programs that successfully met reliability requirements. 
6. Develop interview questions to obtain data to 
answer the primary and secondary research questions. 
7. Question those successful programs for strategies 
for the achievement of reliability requirements. 
8. Evaluate the methodologies by analyzing the data. 
9. Compare responses to literature review and one 
another. 
10. Formulate recommendations based on the analysis of 
the thesis. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I.  Introduction.  This chapter presents the 
problem of the logistics burden and the reliability 
component impact.  It also outlines the FCS and its goal of 
reducing the logistics burden.  The remainder of the thesis 
organization is outlined below. 
Chapter II.  Reliability, Its Effects, and Guidance 
for the Achievement of Requirements.  This chapter provides 
the background of reliability by defining and describing 
reliability and its effects on the logistics burden and 
lifecycle costs.  It also outlines both mandatory and 
discretionary guidance for the achievement of reliability 
requirements.   
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Chapter III.  Methodology.  This chapter outlines the 
methodology of the interviews.  It identifies how the 
interviews occurred, the interview subjects, and the 
questions posed. 
Chapter IV.  Data Summary.  In this chapter, the 
subject’s responses to the interview questions are 
summarized. 
Chapter V.  Data Analysis.  Data, in the form of 
interview responses, is analyzed to discover trends which 
are then compared to published guidance.  Responses are 
also analyzed to identify advantages and disadvantages.   
Chapter VI.  Conclusions and Recommendations. This 
chapter restates the primary and secondary research 
questions, summarizes the findings, and makes 
recommendations for implementation. 
G. BENEFITS 
The achievement of reliability requirements is a 
problem that is currently being studied by the Army due to 
the inability of many programs to achieve reliability 
requirements.  This study will review the importance of 
reliability and its effect on the logistics burden and a 
program’s life cycle costs.  It will also examine what 
guidance exists and what strategies successful programs are 
using to achieve reliability requirements.  The study will 
conclude with recommendations of successful strategies to 
achieve reliability requirements for use by the FCS and all 




II. RELIABILITY, ITS EFFECTS, AND GUIDANCE FOR THE 
ACHIEVEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Army, in attempting to field its Objective Force – 
the force of the future – has focused its efforts on 
reducing the logistics burden.  One prescribed method for 
achieving this is to make systems under development more 
reliable. Systems that are reliable have fewer failures, 
require less maintenance and spares, and have greater 
availability.  Because of this, reliability can act as a 
combat multiplier and also have a profound effect on the 
reduction of the logistics burden and life cycle costs.   
Few acquisition programs have achieved reliability 
requirements in the last decade.  Failure to achieve these 
requirements can result in the fielding of a system that is 
not operationally suitable, delay of fielding to correct 
deficiencies, or cancellation of the program. 
 The Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program, in the early 
stages of development, will attempt to develop a highly 
reliable combat system.  The goal is to field a system with 
a reduced logistics burden, benefiting the Army by 
requiring less logistics support than currently fielded 
systems.   
This chapter provides an overview of reliability and 
its effects on the logistics burden and lifecycle costs, 
introduces the FCS and its reliability requirements, and 
outlines reliability guidance and where reliability is 
encountered in the acquisition life cycle. 
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B. RELIABILTY AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE LOGISTICS BURDEN AND 
LIFE CYCLE COSTS 
1. Introduction to Reliability 
The most widely used definition of reliability is the  
probability that an item will perform its 
intended function for a specified interval under 
stated conditions. [Ref. 2:p. 36] 
The military once had its own definition of 
reliability, which it defined in Military Standard (MIL-
STD) 721-C, Definitions of Terms for Reliability and 
Maintainability, but chose to cancel it. 
In weapon system documents, the military also uses 
terms such as mission reliability and a new concept, ultra-
reliability.  Mission reliability is often defined as “the 
probability that a system will perform mission-essential 
functions for a period of time under conditions stated in 
the mission profile.” [Ref. 4: p. 10-3]  It is commonly 
accepted that ultra-reliability is an exceptionally high 
reliability, with an extremely large Mean Time Between 
Failure.  The National Aeronautic Space Administration 
(NASA) refers to ultra-reliability in software as having a 
failure probability during a one-hour test mission of less 
than 0.0000001.  This means that the software will not fail 
99.99999% of the time. [Ref. 5] 
Reliability probabilities for various components can 
be modeled using different reliability distributions, 
depending upon their characteristics.  The two most common 
are the exponential distribution and the Weibull 
distribution.  The exponential distribution, the simplest 
to model, describes reliability failures in systems such as 
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for electronics, which exhibit a constant failure rate.  
The exponential reliability distribution is expressed as: 
R(t) = e-λt 
where R is the reliability, t is time, and λ is 1/Mean 
Time Between Failure (MTBF). [Ref. 2:p. 39]  MTBF is the 
mean time that a system will successfully perform its 
function before failing and is usually expressed in hours.  
Reliability is therefore an exponential distribution that 
is a function of MTBF and time, and as time increases, 
reliability decreases.    It can therefore be seen that 
MTBF is a key parameter of reliability.   
If in the above equation the MTBF was 1000 hours, λ  
would be 1/1000 or 0.001 and the resulting reliability 
after 100 hours is predicted by the exponential reliability 
distribution to be about 0.90. This means that after 100 
hours of operation, 90% of the time the item will still be 
operational.  After 1000 hours, the reliability would be 
about 0.36, or 36% of the time it will be operational. 
System reliability is dependent upon the reliability 
of the system’s subcomponents and the way they are 
connected.  There are two primary ways of connecting 
subcomponents, these are in series and parallel.  Series 
connection is most common, with parallel connection of 
critical components to provide redundancy and therefore, 
increased reliability. [Ref. 2:p. 41]  In the figure below, 
even though the subcomponents in series connection have a 
higher reliability than the two connected in parallel, the 
overall system reliability for those in series is less than 







Subcomponents in Parallel 
R=1-(1-0.79)(1-0.79)=0.956
Subcomponents in Series 




Figure 1.   Series vs. Parallel Design 
To determine the reliability of a system, the 
individual reliability of the subcomponents in series are 
multiplied together, while for those in parallel, the 
subcomponent unreliabilities (1-R) are multiplied together 
and the unreliability is taken again (1-(1-R)), resulting 
in the predicted reliability. [Ref. 6:p. 32]  The 
reliability of a system with subcomponents in series can be 
no greater than the reliability of the least reliable 
component.  The reliability of a system can be improved by 
placing components in parallel.  This increases the 
reliability because if one component fails, the other 
component, as well as the system, will continue operating.  
The design of equipment and weapon systems has 
increased in complexity over time, which may also reduce 
reliability.  Take for example table one, a tractor that 
only had 1,200 critical parts in 1935 now may have more 
than 2,900 critical parts.  This reduces the tractor’s 
reliability from 88.7% in 1935 to 74.8%, assuming an 
average component reliability of 99.99% and critical 
components arrayed in series.  Worse yet, this translates 
to more than twice the number of tractors failing per 1,000 
tractors now as compared to 1935. A similar prediction may 
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be made when comparing military weapon systems such as the 









per year,* assuming 
an average component 
reliability of 
99.99% 
No. of tractors 
failing per year 
per 1,000 
tractors 
1935 1,200 88.7% 113 
1960 2,250 79.9% 201 
1970 2,400 78.7% 213 
1980 2,600 77.1% 229 
1990 2,900 74.8% 252 
*It is assumed that all critical components are 
reliabilitywise in series. 
Table 1.   Tractor Design Complexity [From Ref. 7:p. 11] 
To illustrate the effect of critical subcomponent 
reliability on the system, consider Table 2.  If 1,000 
critical subcomponents, each having a reliability of 
99.999%, are arrayed in series, the system reliability is 
99.01%.  Now if there are 100,000 critical subcomponents, 
with the same reliability, arrayed in series, the system 
reliability is reduced to only 36.79%.  This figure is even 
worse if the subcomponent reliability is only 99.0%.  
Individual component reliability 
99.999% 99.99% 99.9% 99.0% 
Number of 
critical 
components System reliability 
10 99.99% 99.90% 99.00% 90.44% 
100 99.90% 99.01% 90.48% 36.60% 
250 99.75% 97.53% 77.87% 8.11% 
500 99.50% 95.12% 60.64% 0.66% 
1,000 99.01% 90.48% 36.77% <0.1% 
10,000 90.48% 36.79% <0.1% <0.1% 
100,000 36.79% <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
*It is assumed that all critical components are 
reliabilitywise in series. 
Table 2.   Component Reliability and Design Complexity [From 
Ref. 7:p. 12] 
2.  The Effect of Reliability on the Logistics Burden 
and Lifecycle Costs 
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As the figure below indicates, Operation and Support 
(O&S) costs can be 72% of the life cycle cost (LCC) of a 
system.  The diagram is somewhat dated, using data from 





















SOURCE:  John F. Phillips, DUSD (L)   9/96 
Figure 2.   Nominal Cost Distribution (Typical 1980 DoD 
Acquisition Program with a service life of about 30 years) 
[From Ref. 7:p. 13-6] 
O&S costs are the resources necessary for the 
operation and support of the system, subsystem, or major 
component during its useful life.  These resources may 
consist of such things as fuel, spare parts and 
maintenance, among others.   
Managing and reducing O&S costs is a focus of current 
weapon development programs.  Buying into a weapon system 
may be relatively inexpensive, but operating it and 
maintaining it can be burdensome.  Examining the Army 
budget supports this statement. 
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O&S costs are a large part of the Army budget, 
accounting for almost 33% of the entire budget.  By 
reducing O&S costs, the Army would be able to spend money 
on more critical needs, such as force modernization or 
quality of life.  O&S costs are also rising partially as a 
result of less reliable equipment.  For fiscal year 2002, 
the Army requested $26.7B for Operation and Maintenance 
(also known as O&S), an increase of almost 12% from the 
previous year.   
FY01 vs. FY02 TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY 
($ billions) 
 
APPROPRIATION  FY01 FY02 
Military Personnel  $28.4 $30.2
Operation and Maintenance  23.9 26.7
Procurement  11.0 11.2
Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) 
6.3 6.7
Military Construction  1.3 2.1
Army Family Housing  1.2 1.4
Chemical Demilitarization  1.0 1.2
Base Realignment and Closure .3 .2
Environmental Restoration .4 .4
Total *  $73.7 $80.2
Table 3.   Army FY01 vs. FY02 Total Obligation Authority 
[From Ref. 8] 
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Initial investments in the design and production of 
reliable weapon systems can have an enormous result by 
reducing O&S costs.  Examples of this are found in the 
Minuteman I missile system, which estimated that for every 
dollar invested in the reliability improvement program 
resulted in a return of eight dollars.  Over a ten-year 
period, the net savings was expected to be $160,000,000.  
Another example of this savings is that of the Atlas 
Guidance System.  The result of an annual investment of  
$10,100,000 in a “high” reliability program during 
development and production resulted in an annual savings of  
$58,400,000 after fielding.  A last example is of the F-105 
weapon system, which, by implementing a reliability 
improvement program, increased the reliability of the 
system from 0.7263 to 0.8986, resulting in an annual 
savings estimated at $25,500,000. [Ref. 7:pp. 23-24]  
C. THE FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS AND THE NEED FOR ULTRA-
RELIABILITY 
1. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program 
The FCS Program is a cooperative development program 
between the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), and the United States Army.  DARPA, through its 
Objective Force Program Office (PM-OF), is responsible for 
the management of the first phase of the system’s 
lifecycle, the Concept and Technology Development Phase. 
 
Figure 3.   FCS Program Schedule [From Ref. 9] 
The Army, through the Future Combat Systems Program Office 
(PM-FCS), is developing a streamlined acquisition 
management approach for the program. [Ref. 9] 
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The purpose of the program is to develop a new, 
innovative, advanced warfighting capability by 
incorporating leap-ahead technologies focused on unmanned 
systems.  The program is a Simulation Based Acquisition 
(SBA), whereby contractors and the Government will utilize 
modeling and simulation (M&S) to design and develop the 
force and reduce risk. 
FCS is defined as a  
networked systems of systems that will serve as a 
core building block within all maneuver Unit of 
Action echelons to develop overmatching combat 
power, sustainability, agility, and versatility 
necessary for full spectrum military operations.  
[Ref. 9]   
FCS is envisioned as an ensemble of manned and 
unmanned systems that will fulfill the ground component 
requirement of the Army’s Objective Force.  Key tenets of 
the FCS are “survivability, lethality, deployability, 
agility, sustainability, versatility, and responsiveness.” 
[Ref. 9] 
FCS will be comprised of “networked space-, air- and 
ground-based maneuver, maneuver support and sustainment 
systems.” [Ref. 9] 
A commonly presented concept is depicted in the figure 
below.  It incorporates both an unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) and a ground based robotic vehicle that provide 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
(RSTA). A robotic vehicle equipped with missiles provides a 
beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) indirect fire capability while 
another robotic vehicle equipped with a main gun provides s 
line-of-sight (LOS) direct fire capability.  A central 
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command and control vehicle transports the dismount 
soldiers and provides command, control, communications 
interface (C3I) for the entire system.   



















Figure 4.   FCS Commonly Pre
2. The need for Ultra-
Because FCS relies on
unmanned, robotic vehicles, 
of the system.  Reliability
reduced logistics burden an
For these reasons, the Ho
Secretary of the Army 
Technology) (ASA(ALT)) requ
Board convene a Year 2000 Su
and Tactical Opportunities 
Rapidly Deployable Joint Gr
Era.” [Ref. 11]  One focus 
board examine was the Sustai









MechanismsRobotic NLOS Fire 
y Squad 
sented Concept [From Ref. 10] 
reliability 
 leap-ahead technologies and 
reliability is a chief concern 
 is also necessary to ensure a 
d acceptable lifecycle costs.  
n. Paul J. Hoeper, Assistant 
(Acquisition, Logistics and 
ested that the Army Science 
mmer Study to study “Technical 
for Revolutionary Advances in 
ound Forces in the 2015-2025 
that the ASA(ALT) requested the 
nment and Support of the future 
forces.  The goal of this investigation was to identify a 
sustainment and support capability with a reduced logistics 
burden, a means to provide future forces with a… 
significantly greater systems reliability … along 
with graceful degradation and ultra-reliability 
leading to simplified battlefield maintenance, 
repair, and diagnostics/prognostics (including 
disposable / expendable components / systems). 
[Ref. 11]   
The Army Science Board focused on three problems in 
dealing with FCS Sustainment and Support issues, one of 
which was the reduction in demand for materiel and support 
of the FCS.  A proposed solution was that the FCS be 
designed for supportability with a built-in or inherent 
reliability allowing operation for seven days or more 
without maintenance and support.  Ultimately, the board 
recommended that the FCS achieve ultra-reliability to 
reduce the logistics burden.  The reason for this 
recommendation was because ultra-reliability reduces 
maintenance and support requirements.  It reduces the 
number of maintenance personnel, equipment, and spares 
required for support.  Some estimates indicate that ultra-
reliability can reduce service and support personnel 
requirements in the Objective Force Area of Operations by 
as much as 83%. [Ref. 12:p. 32] 
The Army Science Board further recommended four 
strategies for achieving ultra-reliability.  
Tradeoff/payoff analysis using models and simulations is 
one recommended method for realizing that the benefits of 
achieving ultra-reliability exceed the costs.  A second 
strategy is the use of prognostics and diagnostics, through 
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the use of imbedded sensors.  This will allow maintenance 
actions to occur prior to part failure due to failure 
prediction and analysis.  A third strategy is the 
application of science and engineering principles during 
system design and development to achieve inherent 
reliability requirements.  The last recommended strategy is 
the specification of reliability as a Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) during procurement and acquisition. [Ref. 
12:pp. 42-45] 
Ultimately, the board concluded that ultra-reliability 
should be a KPP for the FCS.  However, many senior Defense 
and Army logisticians, to include the Office of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff (Operations) (ODCSOPS), Office of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff (Procurement) (ODCSPRO), ASA(ALT), and the 
Objective Force Task Force disagreed with this 
recommendation.  The reasons provided for their 
disagreement are that it is too early in the lifecycle to 
designate a KPP, it reduces the trade space, and it 
constrains the Program Manager’s flexibility.  Only the 
Headquarters, Army Materiel Command/Army Materiel Systems 
Analysis Activity (HQ AMC/AMSAA) and the Office of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics) (ODCSLOG) agreed that 
ultra-reliability should be a KPP. [Ref. 3] 
3. FCS Reliability Requirements 
The DARPA/Army FCS Program Solicitation, released in 
November 2001, emphasized the need for reliable systems in 
the development of the FCS.  It recognized that FCS 
reliability was “critical to reducing [the] logistics foot 
print and lifecycle cost.” [Ref. 9:p. 76] 
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To achieve this, the solicitation required the FCS 
have the following reliability capabilities: 
1. ultra-reliable and/or redundant components to 
remain operationally effective for the full 3/7-
day mission period with minimal pulsed service or 
repair organic to the Unit of Action. [Ref. 9:p. 
76]  
2. reduce demand and minimize the maneuver 
sustainment burden on unit effectiveness through 
balanced system reliability, redundancy and 
repair, to include embedded diagnostics and 
prognostics as well as modular component design. 
[Ref. 9:p. 76]   
Specified reliability deliverables required the 
contractor to: 
1. Propose reliability, maintainability and 
testability criteria, e.g., confidence levels and 
no evidence of failure. [Ref. 9:p. 76] 
2. Identify recommended reliability, 
maintainability and testability criteria to be 
tested in SDD prototype testing (PQT and LUT). 
[Ref. 9:p. 76] 
D. MANDATORY AND DESCRETIONARY GUIDANCE FOR ACHIEVING 
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
There are many sources of reliability guidance for the 
military to assist programs in achieving reliability 
requirements.  The amount of mandatory guidance, however, 
has decreased as a result of acquisition reform. 
This section will present the sources of guidance and 
the nature of the guidance, whether it is mandatory or 
discretionary.  It will also identify where in the 
lifecycle of a program the Program Manager should implement 
the guidance. 
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1. Mandatory Guidance 
There are four mandatory sources of reliability 
guidance relevant to the Army.  Two are Department of 
Defense Directives, DoDD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition 
System, and DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated 
Information System (MAIS).  Two are mandatory Army 
Regulations are AR 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy and AR 71-
9, Materiel Requirements. [Ref. 13] 
DoDD 5000.1, directs that 
acquisition program managers shall focus on 
logistics considerations early in the design 
process to ensure that they deliver reliable 
systems that can be cost-effectively supported 
and provide users with the necessary support 
infrastructure to meet peacetime and wartime 
readiness requirements. [Ref. 14] 
DoD 5000.2-R, directs the PM to  
develop RAM system requirements based on the 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and TOC 
(Total Ownership Cost) consideration, and state 
them in quantifiable, operational terms, 
measurable during development and operational 
T&E. [Ref. 15] 
It further states “reliability requirements shall address 
mission reliability and logistic reliability.” [Ref. 15] 
AR 70-1 states 
when reliability and maintainability requirements 
are included in solicitations, they should be 
included by specifying: 
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quantified reliability and maintainability 
requirements and allowable uncertainties (such as 
statistical risks), 
failure definitions and thresholds (FDSC), and  
life-cycle usage conditions (OMS/MP). [Ref. 16:p. 
18] 
It further states that 
solicitations should not cite any specification, 
standard or handbook or include language 
specifying ‘how to’ design, manufacture or test 
for reliability.  MIL HBK 217, Reliability 
Prediction of Electronic Equipment, is not to 
appear in any solicitation as it has been shown 
to be unreliable and its use can lead to 
erroneous and misleading reliability predictions. 
[Ref. 16:p. 19] 
AR 70-1, states in paragraph 5-13 Performance-based 
requirements, “where certain critical processes must be 
contractually required in order to protect both parties’ 
interest,” [Ref. 16:p. 20] in considering program 
complexity and risk, offerors may be required to first use 
their own processes, secondly use industry accepted 
standards, and lastly use Government developed processes to 
achieve key attributes or performance parameters.  Because 
the objective is to encourage the use of non-Governmental 
processes, the program manager must obtain a waiver from 
the Milestone Decision Authority. 
In comparison to section 5-8, Defining R&M 
Requirements, this latitude is not given for achieving R&M 
requirements.  Contractors are instead expected to achieve 
the requirements on their own. 
AR 71-9 directs that 
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an effective R&M program that focuses on 
achievement of operational requirements and O&S 
cost targets is necessary to ensure that user 
operational reliability requirements will be met.  
CBTDEVs and TNGDEVs will participate with MATDEVs 
in defining an effective, tailored R&M program 
for each system pursued. [Ref. 17:p. 14] 
The regulation also goes on to state  
CBTDEV/TNGDEV will provide an operational mode 
summary/mission profile (OMS/MP) and a failure 
definition and scoring criteria (FDSC) to support 
the reliability requirement.  [Ref. 17:p. 14]   
2. Discretionary Guidance 
In addition to the mandatory guidance, there are many 
discretionary sources of reliability guidance.  These 
discretionary sources consist mostly of Department of the 
Army Pamphlets and Military Handbooks.  Because there are 
so many, only some of the most relevant sources will be 
identified. 
DA-PAM 70-3, Army Acquisition Procedures, devotes an 
entire section to Reliability, Maintainability and 
Availability.  It provides discretionary guidance 
concerning establishment of Reliability and Maintainability 
(R&M) requirements, management, engineering and design, 
testing, integrated process teams and their assessment. 
[Ref. 18:pp. 99-105] 
There are also several military handbooks that address 
reliability.  These include MIL-HDBK-781A, Handbook for 
Reliability Test Methods, Plans, and Environments for 
Engineering Development, Qualification, and Production, and 
MIL-HDBK-189, Reliability Growth Management. 
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MIL-HDBK-781A provides a list of reliability test 
methods, reliability test plans, and environmental profile 
data to use as a guide when testing systems for contractual 
reliability requirements during developmental testing.  The 
reliability test methods and plans include such things as 
growth monitoring and MTBF assurance testing.  Test 
environmental profiles are provided for test environments 
for equipment, vehicles, and aircraft.  This testing is 
necessary to identify defects and failures so they may be 
corrected prior to fielding.  The information contained in 
the handbook is applicable to all systems and can be 
tailored for any program. [Ref. 19] 
MIL-HDBK-189 outlines reliability growth concepts and 
methodologies for management of reliability growth during 
the developmental stage.  It first presents the fundamental 
concepts followed by details for concept implementation. 
[Ref. 20] 
There is not as much regulatory guidance as there has 
been in the past.  Many mandatory standards and 
specifications have been canceled or made discretionary as 
a result of acquisition reform. 
3. Acquisition Reform and Its Effects 
Acquisition Reform has had a great impact on the 
management of acquisition programs.  Key tenants of 
Acquisition Reform are “better, faster, cheaper.”  With 
these objectives, many changes were made to the acquisition 
process in an attempt to improve the process.  
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One significant change was the dependence on 
commercial industry to use their practices and standards in 
favor of military standards and specifications.  This 
change was made after commercial industry identified 
military detailed specifications as unnecessary cost 
drivers.  In September 1985, the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Logistics & Technology), mandated that the 
preference for specifications would be first for 
performance specifications, then commercial specifications, 
then, as a last resort, for military specifications. [Ref. 
21]  As a result, many military standards and 
specifications were revoked, suspended, deleted, or 
amended. 
One mandatory source of reliability management 
guidance that was canceled was DoD 5000.20, Reliability and 
Maintainability.  This directive established policies and 
responsibility for the reliability and maintainability of 
defense systems, subsystems, and equipment.  It implemented 
the principles of DoD Directives and Instructions for major 
system acquisition and for test and evaluation. 
Another mandatory source of reliability management 
guidance that was canceled was MIL-STD-785B, Reliability 
Program for Systems and Equipment Development and 
Production.  This standard was comprised of application 
requirements, reliability program tasks, and an application 
matrix that provided guidance and rationale for the 
selection of tasks.  It encouraged task selection tailoring 
for each program.  Selected tasks could be used to 
solicit facts and recommendations from the 
contractors on the need for, and scope of, the 
work to be done rather than requiring that a 
specific task be done in a specific way. [Ref. 
22] 
It also included increased emphasis on reliability 
engineering tasks and tests to prevent, detect, and correct 
“design deficiencies, weak parts, and workmanship defects.” 
[Ref. 22]  A discretionary handbook providing this guidance 
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was to be published, however, the standard was canceled 
with no superseding document. 
E. RELIABILITY AND THE ACQUISITION LIFECYCLE 
Reliability requirements are found throughout the 
acquisition process.  This section attempts to outline some 
of the most important processes involving reliability 
within the acquisition lifecycle, depicted in the figure 
below. 
 
Figure 5.   The 5000 Model [From Ref. 23:p. 8] 
1. Technology Opportunities & User Needs 
This is a pre-acquisition period during which the user 
needs are developed, and science and technology and concept 
development efforts are undertaken in the development of a 
material solution.  The user needs are expressed in a 
Mission Needs Statement (MNS) that is developed in response 
to a threat. [Ref. 23:p. 9] 
2. Concept & Technology Development 
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Concept & Technology Development is separated by a 
decision review into Concept Exploration and Component 
Advanced Development.  Concept Exploration is a period of 
concept studies to define and evaluate alternative 
concepts.  The organization with the mission need conducts 
an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to identify possible 
system alternatives and their sensitivities to changing 
assumptions. This gives insight to Key Performance 
Parameters and their contribution to operational 
capability. [Ref. 23:p. 13]  
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Alternatives identified by the AoA are refined through 
cost-performance tradeoff studies to determine cost drivers 
for system characteristics.  Studies may also determine 
achievable reliability objectives with respect to cost, 
schedule, and performance for each alternative.  Similarly 
fielded systems may also be studied to determine 
operational reliability deficiencies.  From these studies, 
the Combat Developer (CBTDEV), as part of the integrated 
concept team (ICT), develops system operational 
requirements, of which reliability should be one.  These 
operational requirements are consolidated in the 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) during the 
requirements generation process.  Requirements that are 
considered critical to the success of the system’s mission 
are designated as Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).  The 
operational requirements address operational effectiveness 
(performance oriented), as well as operational suitability 
(supportability oriented), of which reliability is key.  
Reliability should be a focus here to ensure that it is not 
unnecessarily sacrificed or ignored.  By designating it as 
a KPP, reliability will receive the emphasis it requires.  
Normally, reliability requirements are stated as a 
quantitative mission reliability and logistics reliability 
objective. [Ref. 23:p. 14] 
This process leads to the finalization of the ORD and 
identification of KPPs, the Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB), and lifecycle cost estimates. 
At the decision review, the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) selects the preferred concept for 
development with available technologies.  The program then 
commences to Component Advanced Development. 
During the Component Advanced Development period, a 
concept for the required capability exists, however the 
architecture is still unknown.  When the system 
architecture has been identified and the component 
technology has been demonstrated, the program may proceed 
into the next phase. [Ref. 23:p. 15] 
3. System Development and Demonstration 
The objective during this phase is to 
develop a system, reduce program risk, ensure 
operational supportability, design for 
producibility, ensure affordability, ensure 
protection of Critical Program Information, and 
demonstrate system integration, interoperability 
and utility. [Ref. 23:p. 17] 
This is accomplished through the use of simulation-based 
acquisition and test and evaluation which are guided by a 
system acquisition strategy and test and evaluation master 
plan (TEMP). 
This phase is divided into two approaches, System 
Integration and System Demonstration.  At entry into System 
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Integration, a system architecture exists but components 
have not been integrated into a complete system.  When 
integration has been demonstrated with prototypes and 
system configuration is documented, the system may enter 
System Demonstration.  During System Demonstration, the 
system is demonstrated in its operational environment and 
may enter the next phase if it meets the requirements and 
commercial capabilities are available. [Ref. 23:p. 17] 
During this phase, the system engineering process is 
used iteratively to translate operational requirements into 
a system configuration and integrate reliability and other 
supportability factors to meet cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives.  Reliability Engineers complete 
analysis such as failure modes, fault tree, and parameter 
design with designers and other engineers to determine 
achievability of operational readiness and supportability.  
Reliability verification through testing programs are also 
used to verify the design reliability.   
4. Production and Deployment 
In this phase, the system is approved for Low Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP) during which a limited number of 
systems are produced to establish the manufacturing 
capability.  Reliability testing programs are also emplaced 
to ensure reliability levels are maintained during 
production.  Failure prevention and corrective actions are 
emplaced to determine product or process improvements.  
Production representative articles are tested to determine 
operational effectiveness and suitability during Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) and Live Fire Test 
and Evaluation (LFT&E).    Upon successful completion of 
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testing, the system is approved for Full Rate Production 
(FRP) and deployment to the using units. [Ref. 23:p. 23] 
5. Operations and Support 
Operations and Support is divided into two parts, 
Sustainment and Disposal.  During Sustainment, the system 
is supported with a program meeting operational support 
requirements in the most cost-effective manner.  During 
this phase, warranties, such as reliability improvement 
warranties, may be used to ensure continuous improvement of 
the fielded system through engineering change proposals to 
faulty components.  Additionally, reliability centered 
maintenance may be implemented to identify reliability 
degrading trends and determine root cause.  Upon reaching 
the end of its useful life, the system is disposed of, but 
not after possible service life extension or rebuild 
programs. [Ref. 23:p. 27] 
F. SUMMARY 
High reliability is an important and necessary 
requirement for weapon system development.  It can reduce 
the logistics burden felt by the services and also reduce 
lifecycle costs, freeing funds for the procurement of new 
equipment to modernize the force. 
However, its achievement can be elusive for many 
weapon system programs.  The FCS is one weapon system 
program currently in development that is attempting to 
achieve high or ultra-reliability to reduce the logistics 
burden.   
Both mandatory and discretionary guidance for 
establishing and achieving reliability requirements exists, 
however, there is not as much as there once was.  Also, 
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once mandatory military standards and specifications have 
been canceled or made discretionary in favor of commercial 
practices. 
Because reliability is encountered throughout the 
lifecycle, it is necessary to effectively and efficiently 
manage it.  Therefore, an exploratory investigation is 
necessary to determine what successful programs are doing 













III.  METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the methodology used for the 
collection of data.  It includes the purpose of the study, 
the research method, the questions asked, and the selection 
of study subjects and their description. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this exploratory study was to determine 
what successful programs implemented to achieve reliability 
requirements given that more than 80% of programs fail.  
The objective of the study was to identify successful 
practices, pitfalls, and recommendations for process 
improvement.  The study focused on those successful 
programs that recently achieved reliability requirements 
and those people who were intimately involved with the 
achievement of reliability requirements. 
C. EXPLORATORY STUDY 
1. Study Overview   
The primary objective of the interviews was to 
identify how successful programs achieved reliability 
requirements.  Programs that were successful in achieving 
reliability requirements were identified, and a person 
familiar with the program’s reliability requirements was 
then identified and questioned about program practices.  
2. Interview Question Development  
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Questions evolving from the secondary research 
questions were developed to determine the successful 
strategies or practices used by programs to achieve 
reliability requirements.  The focus of these questions was 
to identify the program’s organization, how requirements 
were established, managed, and achieved, and when the 
program focused on reliability.  Additional questions were 
asked to gather lessons learned and recommendations for 
improving the process.  Lastly, questions were posed to 
determine if ultra-reliability was achievable and 
worthwhile.  The interview questions are found in Appendix 
A. 
The first series of questions were developed to 
determine the organization of the programs to achieve their 
objective requirements.  The questions asked how the 
program was organized for reliability to determine if an 
Integrated Product Team was used, and who primarily was 
responsible for reliability issues within the program. 
The second series of questions were intended to 
determine the development of reliability requirements.  The 
questions asked if the program had any input in 
establishing reliability requirements, how they were 
determined, and what the requirements according to the 
Operational Requirements Document were, how they were 
worded, and how they were conveyed to the contractor. 
The third series of questions were developed to 
determine how the programs managed reliability.  The 
questions asked how the contractor managed reliability 
growth, and what oversight the program office had.  Other 
questions asked if the program had a Reliability Program 
Plan, what its key elements were and if their approach was 
varied.  The last question asked what primary sources of 
reliability guidance were used and if there was adequate 
guidance.  
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The fourth series of questions were developed to 
determine what processes programs used to achieve 
reliability requirements and how this was measured.  The 
first question asked if reliability was a Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) to determine the relative importance.  The 
next questions asked what level of reliability was achieved 
and how successful the program considered itself and why.  
The next questions asked how reliability growth was 
measured, how testing was performed, what the key source of 
unreliability was, and how developmental reliability 
figures compared with operational figures.  The last 
questions asked if the contractor was incentivized in any 
way and how the program planned to maintain the system’s 
reliability once fielded. 
The fifth series of questions were developed to 
determine when, in the acquisition lifecycle, programs 
focused on reliability.  Also asked were some of the most 
important steps or processes within the acquisition 
lifecycle. 
The sixth series of questions were intended to gather 
lessons learned, recommendations for improvement, and 
pitfalls to avoid. 
The last series of questions were developed to 
determine, in the opinion of the subject, if ultra-
reliability was achievable and worthwhile. 
3. Identification of Study Subjects 
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Study participants were identified by the Director of 
Reliability and Maintainability, Army Test and Evaluation 
Command (ATEC). Selection of the study participants was 
based on successful or near successful completion of 
Operational Testing with respect to reliability.  The 
reason successful programs were chosen is twofold.  First, 
successful programs would better understand how to achieve 
reliability requirements than unsuccessful programs.  
Second, successful programs would be more willing to share 
the reasons for their success.  Of the more than 140 
programs for which ATEC has visibility, only ten programs 
were identified as successful. [Ref. 24] These ten programs 
included: Abrams System Enhancement Program (SEP), Bradley 
A3, Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST), M270A1 Launcher, 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Aviation Mission 
Planning System (AMPS), Long Range Advanced Sensor System 
Suite (LRAS3), Modular Crowd Control Munition (MCCM), and 
Target Point Illuminator Aiming Light (TPIAL).  Of the ten 
programs, two, the MCCM and TPIAL, had no Reliability 
Engineers or reliability programs because of the design 
simplicity and non-developmental nature of the programs, 
and one, M270A1 Launcher, could not be reached for 
questionning.  After contacting the programs, two more 
programs were added to the list because of successful 
reliability achievement.  These two programs are Driver’s 
Vision Enhancement (DVE) and Tactical Weapons Sight (TWS).  
A brief description with reliability requirements and 
achievements of each of the nine programs questioned 
follows. 
a. Abrams System Enhancement Package (SEP) 
Abrams SEP upgrades the M1A2 Abrams tank by 
adding second-generation thermal sensors, Embedded Battle 
Command (EBC) command and control software, a Temperature 
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Management System (TMS), and an Under Armor Auxiliary Power 
Unit (UAAPU), among others. [Ref. 25]   
The Abrams SEP Program conducted Follow-on 
Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) IV in November 
2000.  The system had a requirement for 101 Mean Miles 
Between Failure (MMBF) and demonstrated 511 MMBF.  The 
system also required a combat reliability requirement of 
320 MMBF and demonstrated 881 MMBF. 
b. Bradley A3 
The Bradley A3 integrates the Second Generation 
Forward Looking Infrared in the Improved Bradley 
Acquisition System (IBAS) sight and Commander’s Independent 
Viewer (CIV), automated ballistic solutions and target 
tracking software. [Ref. 26]   
The Bradley A3 Program conducted Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) in the fall of 
2000.  The system had a requirement for 400 Mean Miles 
Between Failure (MMBF) and demonstrated 417 MMBF.   
c. Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) 
The BFIST integrates the Second Generation 
Forward Looking InfraRed, Commander’s Independent Viewer 
(CIV), Improved Fire Control, and Fire Support Vehicle 
Mission Equipment Package onto a Bradley. [Ref. 27] 
The BFIST Program had a reliability requirement 
of 675 MMBF.  The program conducted a Production 
Qualification Test, demonstrating 992 MMBF and a Production 





d. Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) 
The FMTV Program uses a common truck chassis for 
several vehicle configurations in two payload classes (2.5 
ton and 5 ton) and two tactical trailers with complementary 
payloads. [Ref. 28:p. 281]   
The FMTV Program recently underwent Production 
Verification Testing in January 1999.  Reliability 
requirements and achievements are depicted in the table 
below. 
 Requirement (MMBHMF) Achievement (MMBHMF) 
LMTV Cargo 5500 13333 
LMTV Van 4200 6667 
LMTV Trailer 2800 20000 
MTV Cargo 5500 19048 
MTV Tractor 3800 6667 
MTV Wrecker 2800 4000 
MTV Trailer 2600 20000 
Table 4.    FMTV Reliability Requirements/Achievements 
 
e. High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV) 
The HMMWV Program is a tri-service program using 
a light, highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-drive 
vehicle with a common chassis for several configurations.  
A2 improvements include a four-speed, electronic 
transmission, a 6.5-liter diesel engine, and 
transportability improvements. [Ref. 28:p. 265]  
The HMMWV Program’s recent test results are 
depicted in the table below. 
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HMMWV Carrier Requirement (MMBHMF) Achievement (MMBHMF) 
Cargo  1900 4292 
TOW/Armament 1800 2937 
Shelter 1600 2947 
Ambulance 1600 1667 
Table 5.   HMMWV Reliability Requirements/Achievements 
 
f. Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS) 
AMPS is a Personal Computer based subordinate 
system of the Army Battle Command System, Maneuver Control 
System.  AMPS facilitates aviation planning functions and 
automates brigade and below planning and distribution of 
mission files. [Ref. 29]  
AMPS recently underwent Operational Testing in 
March and April 2001.  The system had a requirement for 154 
hours Mean Time Between Mission Affecting Failure (MTBMAF) 
and demonstrated 233.3 hours MTBMAF. 
g. Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance 
System (LRAS3) 
LRAS3 consists of a second generation Forward 
Looking Infrared with long-range optics, eye-safe laser 
rangefinder, a day video camera, and a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) operating in both mounted and dismounted 
configurations. [Ref. 28:p. 105] 
The system had a requirement for 330 hours Mean 
Time Between Essential Function Failure (MTBEFF) and 
demonstrated 364 hours MTBEFF. 
h. Driver’s Vision Enhancement (DVE) 
The DVE is a passive, un-cooled thermal-imaging 
system for drivers of combat and tactical wheeled vehicles.  
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The sensor module consists of a second-generation Forward 
Looking Infrared device that delivers a video image to a 
high-quality, commercial, flat-panel display and control 
module. [Ref. 30] 
The system had a requirement for 740 hours Mean 
Time Between Operational Mission Failure (MTBOMF) and 
demonstrated 776 hours MTBOMF. 
i. Tactical Weapon Sight (TWS) 
The AN/PAS-13 TWS is a family of low-cost, 
lightweight, infrared imaging devices using second-
generation Forward Looking Infrared with medium to high 
resolution.  The system provides a standard video output 
for training, image transfer or remote viewing and is used 
for fire control of individual and crew-served weapons. 
[Ref. 30] 
The system had a requirement for 250 hours MTBOMF 
and demonstrated 3513 hours MTBOMF.  
4. Interviews 
Interviews were scheduled for the last two weeks of 
February and the first week of March 2002.  Introductory 
telephone calls were made prior to e-mailing letters of 
introduction with questionnaire attachments.  Appendix B 
contains a sample e-mail message with a letter of 
introduction.  Study subjects were offered the option to 
answer the questionnaire by e-mail or by telephone. 
D. SUMMARY 
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The methodology for collecting the data was to 
identify successful programs and those people within the 
program who had intimate knowledge of reliability issues.  
These people were questioned regarding their practices in 
achieving reliability requirements, lessons learned, and 
thoughts on ultra-reliability.  The results of the 









































IV.  DATA SUMMARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the subjective data gathered 
from the interviews.  Data is summarized, presenting common 
trends and differences.  Questions and responses are 
grouped by subject area: Organizing for reliability; 
requirement development; reliability management; 
reliability achievement; reliability timeline; lessons 
learned/recommendations for improvement; and ultra-
reliability. 
B. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
A total of seven interviews involving nine programs 
were conducted as scheduled with two telephonic interviews 
on 26 February and 4 March 2002, and the remainder by e-
mail.  Results are presented below.  Respondents are not 
identified to protect anonymity. 
1. Organizing for Reliability 
The objective of these questions was to determine if 
programs used dedicated Reliability Integrated Product 
Teams (IPTs) and who, within the program, was primarily 
responsible for reliability.  
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Eight of nine programs stated that the Test 
Integration Working Group (TIWG) was primarily responsible 
for developing reliability requirements, while only one 
program had a Reliability IPT for this.  A Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability (RAM) integrated working 
group was incorporated subordinately into the TIWG.  This 
group developed the Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria 
(FDSC) and “crosswalked and confirmed requirements with the 
ORD”.  The TIWG was also primarily responsible for 
developing the test plan for the program.  The TIWG was 
composed of representatives from the test and evaluation 
community, the material developer, and the user.  The TIWG 
met at least quarterly initially, then more often, usually 
monthly and bimonthly, just prior to and during tests.  
Primary responsibility for reliability within the 
programs was assigned to a reliability and maintainability 
branch chief in two cases.  In most other programs, a 
Reliability Engineer, most often provided by matrix 
support, was responsible for program reliability.  Of the 
few programs that did not have Reliability Engineers, 
Mechanical Engineers were primarily responsible for 
reliability.  These representatives were most often 
supported by the TIWG and were members of the RAM scoring 
and assessment conferences. 
2. Requirement Development 
The objective of these questions was to determine if 
programs had influenced requirement establishment. 
In all cases, a program reliability representative was 
able to provide input for establishing reliability 
requirements.  This was most often accomplished through the 
use of a RAM Rationale Report.  The user representative 
would develop the requirements based on what was considered 
as the need.  The program reliability representative then 
analyzed the requirement considering “if industry may be 
able to meet those requirements with [the technology] 
industry has available today.”   If analysis supported the 
requirement, and it was acceptable to both the user and 
program representative, it remained unchanged.   
  42
Reliability requirements for all programs were 
primarily based on historical data from similar previous 
systems, taking into consideration “state of the art and 
technical feasibility.”  In one case, “200,000 miles of 
historical RAM maturity” data was used.  Other methods 
included “leveraging similar component reliability using 
other similar programs,” and the “Duane modeling 
methodology.” In another case, data from the Rome Analysis 
Center’s, Reliability Engineer’s Toolkit and manufacturer’s 
specifications were also considered in developing 
requirements.   
These requirements, outlined in the previous chapter, 
were included in contract performance specifications, 
Acquisition Program Baselines, and Milestone III Exit 
Criteria.  In most cases, the reliability requirements were 
worded as Mean Miles Between Failure (MMBF) for mechanical 
systems or Mean Time Between Essential Function Failure 
(MTBEFF) for electrical systems.  In two cases, the 
reliability requirements from the Operational Requirements 
Document were expressed in terms of Mean Miles Between 
Operational Mission Failure (MMBOMF).  It was necessary to 
express these requirements as functions of hardware in 
terms of Mean Miles Between Hardware Mission Failure 
(MMBHMF) so that the contractor could be held responsible 
for sytem performance. To make the conversion between 
MMBOMF and MMBHMF, a historical “rule of thumb” was used, 
increasing the operational requirement by one-third to 
arrive at the system requirement. 
3. Reliability Management 
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The objective of these questions was to determine if 
programs implemented a Reliability Program Plan. 
In two cases, programs began development and testing 
before implementation of specification reform.   This 
reform prevented specifying ‘how to’ design, manufacture or 
test for reliability to contractors.  One program stated 
that the reason for its success was because it was started 
prior to specification reform. 
Another program stated that AR 702-3 was the 
controlling document for its program.  The contractor 
prepared a RAM design guidebook to be used in all designs 
and “detailed documentation along with approved contractor 
program plans allowed for oversight and review of the 
contractor progress.”   
One program used “Tiger Teams” of contractor 
representatives to conduct root cause analysis for “hot 
issues.”  Additionally, a Corrective Action Management 
Review (CAMR), which had representatives from both the 
program and contractor, periodically conducted reviews to 
answer systemic reliability issues.  
Another program’s prime contractor was a Government 
agency, which already had a proven reliability.  Oversight 
was accomplished through design reviews and configuration 
control meetings. 
Only three programs had Reliability Program Plans 
prepared for the program office.  Two others had plans 
prepared, which the contractor followed.  The remaining 
programs that didn’t have plans, stated that they weren’t 
necessary because of the limited developmental nature of 
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the program or because of improvement upon a legacy system.  
One legacy system program had used Reliability Program 
Plans in the past that included Failure Modes, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), reliability growth curves, 
corrective actions systems, and other key metrics. 
Of those programs that had Reliability Program Plans, 
most of the plans were followed closely to ensure the 
contractor was on the “right track.”  Some plans may have 
varied based upon reliability issues such as failures and 
corrective actions, or to consider value-adding changes. 
The primary sources of Government guidance used 
consisted of both canceled and current publications.  The 
sources included MIL-STD-781 and MIL-HDBK-781, Reliability 
Testing for Engineering Development, Qualification, and 
Production, MIL-HDBK-189, Reliability Growth Management, AR 
702-3, Army Materiel Systems Reliability, Availability, and 
Maintainability (RAM), TRADOC Pamphlet 70-11, RAM Rationale 
Handbook, AR 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy and MIL-STD-
1629, Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis.  Additional information was gathered 
from other military standards, best practices and meetings 
with experts in the field. 
Some respondents felt there was not enough guidance 
and “we went from one extreme to the other in specification 
reform.” Another believed it was now necessary to develop 
reliability policies and ensure they’re enforced.   
4. Reliability Achievement 
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The objective of these questions was to determine what 
processes programs used to achieve reliability requirements 
and how this was measured. 
Reliability requirements were a Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) for only one program.  In another case, it 
was stated that reliability exceeded the KPP level and 
received 4-star (general officer) visibility.  The other 
programs agreed that reliability was important and 
“essential to fielding an acceptable system to the 
soldiers”.   
Two programs rated their reliability achievements 
(outlined in the previous chapter) as extremely successful 
because they exceeded their requirement.  The reasons 
stated for their success were due to early establishment of 
FDSC, well managed scoring conferences, working with the 
user and RAM community, funded and continuous well managed 
tests, and an effective failure analysis process as well as 
processing of Engineering Change Proposals. 
Two programs rated themselves as moderately successful 
because they exceeded the requirement, but were plagued 
with software or hardware problems. 
The remaining five programs rated themselves as 
average because of difficulty in achieving requirements and 
also because they are continuing to mature the program. One 
program indicated its primary reason for success was due to 
“hard requirements” that had to be met due to the program’s 
visibility.  The program also said “top management” must 
tout the importance of reliability achievement. 
The use of design analysis tools or processes for root 
cause analysis varied by program.  One respondent stated 
that the program “didn’t work to influence design” because 
of the integration of non-developmental items.  The program 
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only relied on the test-fix-test process during the test 
phase. 
One program used Failure Reporting and Corrective 
Action System (FRACAS) to quickly analyze failures and make 
corrections.  The program used site contractor 
representatives to provide more timely data than Government 
systems were capable of. 
Another program used a fishbone cause and effect 
process, FMECA, Sneak Circuit Analysis, fault tree, and 
component level Environmental Stress Screening (ESS), 
Highly Accelerated Life Testing (HALT), and Highly 
Accelerated Stress Testing (HAST) as its primary design 
analysis tools. 
To manage design analysis, three programs created a 
database to track failures during testing and to conduct 
root cause analysis with technical engineers from both the 
Government and contractor. 
Both developmental and operational testing played a 
major role in determining reliability achievement for all 
programs.  All programs used many iterations of test-fix-
test during developmental tests prior to operational 
testing.  Three programs also used Limited User Tests as a 
prelude to Operational Testing.  Additionally, due to the 
maturity of their program, three programs used Production 
Qualification Tests (PQT) and Production Verification Tests 
(PVT) to ensure quality and verify the production line. 
In comparing reliability figures from Developmental 
Testing to Operational testing, most programs agreed that 
there was a reduction due to environment, maintenance, and 
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“operator induced failures” although in some cases, it was 
hard to measure, especially when testing software.  One 
program experienced only a 10-15% reduction, while two 
others experienced a 20-30% reduction. 
Key sources of reliability problems were cited as 
mostly due to hardware, although some software problems 
were noted.  Most hardware problems were a result of the 
environment due to water and mud infiltration of seals, 
vibration, and extreme temperature variation.  Software was 
also a problem, and in one case, the “software architecture 
was not robust and did not lend itself to continuous change 
and upgrade.” 
In only two cases, the contractor was incentivized to 
achieve reliability requirements.  This was not implemented 
for the entire system, but only for “troublesome 
components… to assure getting required life with a bonus 
for life beyond requirements.”  Most other programs 
considered incentivizing the contractor to be unnecessary 
because the contractor was required to achieve requirements 
in the contract.  For one program, “continuance of the 
program was the incentive, it either met reliability or 
there wasn’t a program.” 
In planning for maintaining the system’s reliability 
after fielding, one respondent “hadn’t thought about that.”  
This respondent believed that once reliability requirements 
were achieved, it was unnecessary to try to maintain that 
level unless major engineering changes were made to the 
system.  If engineering changes were made, then it would be 
necessary to test to check reliability and use the test-
fix-test process.  It was also thought that because the 
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operating environment couldn’t be controlled, collection of 
field data was unnecessary and couldn’t be incorporated 
into the program because it was inaccurate.  The respondent 
went on to state that logisticians are more interested in 
this information and will make appropriate recommendations 
to the Program Manager for reliability improvement. 
Another program uses Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) system service representatives at major installations 
where the system is fielded.  These contractor service 
representatives are similar to Army Materiel Command (AMC) 
Logistics Assistance Representatives.  They “provide 
technical expertise for correcting problems, locate parts, 
and suggest engineering change proposals.” The difference 
is that service representatives are specific to only one 
type of system and are therefore, more knowledgeable, 
especially for newly fielded systems.  They also gather 
availability data and analyze it for the source of downtime 
in an attempt to improve it. 
Another program used a Field Problem Review board to 
analyze field data and “decide what problems to 
investigate, fix, and retrofit in the field.”  The program 
would also periodically test a production system to ensure 
production systems still met reliability requirements. 
A similar support plan was used by another program.  
This program used a System Assessment Management program 
and Corrective Action Management Reviews (CAMR) to ensure 
reliability after fielding. 
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Another program planned to “monitor the system’s 
reliability after fielding via Deficiencies Product Reports 
(DPR) and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS).” 
One last program believed the Army does not adequately 
“track reliability for systems once they are fielded.”  The 
Army maintenance system is not equipped to “capture 
valuable data that could be used to formulate reliability 
requirements for future vehicles.”  “Lessons learned in the 
field could be applied to current procurements to save time 
and money in the future.” 
5. Reliability Timeline 
The objective of these questions was to determine when 
to focus on reliability and what some of the most important 
steps and processes within the lifecycle were. 
All programs began focusing on reliability early in 
the acquisition lifecycle.  Most programs agreed that from 
“day one,” reliability should be a key focus of the 
program.  It was essential for the program to be involved 
in establishing reliability requirements and getting 
leadership to “support the reliability program requirements 
and insure they will be met.” 
Four programs said that reliability must be a key 
focus during System Development and Demonstration (SDD) 
phase of the lifecycle. 
Some responses for the most important steps affecting 
reliability were outlined as beginning with establishing 
requirements.  It is important to ensure “early, accurate 
analysis of requirements” and that they are “agreed to and 
understood by all as early as possible.”  Next was the 
development of Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria to 
clearly outline failures for analyzing test results.   
Followed by steps to influence design using and to predict 
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or estimate reliability.  Lastly, was test-analyze-test to 
ensure reliability achievement. 
6. Lessons Learned/Recommendations for Improvement 
The objective of these questions was to identify any 
lessons learned from the program’s attempts to achieve 
reliability requirements and to also identify 
recommendations for improvement to the acquisition process 
regarding reliability. 
Responses varied for steps or processes that should be 
changed.  One program indicated the Army maintenance system 
should be responsible for collecting failure data.  This 
would allow Reliability Engineers to use this data to 
establish requirements for future components or systems.  
Similarly, another program thought a more active role was 
required in component decisions and better planning was 
needed for availability of spares.   
Another program indicated that some specifications and 
standards should be reinstated which was reinforced by 
another program that thought the contractor should be 
required to use reliability data gathered from the field in 
designing the system.  Two programs indicated that the 
Government should be more stringent in enforcing contractor 
achievement of reliability requirements. 
A last program wanted to “allow probability range on 
combat mission failures.”  This program also indicated that 
the programs should use “technical versus operational 
testing.”  It also thought that “participation of the 
system contractor” should be allowed in operational 
testing.   
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Suggestions for other programs to achieve reliability 
requirements were wide ranging.  Most programs did agree 
that it was necessary to “get management to focus on 
reliability.”  A majority of the programs also agreed that 
it is necessary to ensure effective communications between 
the program, user, contractor, and RAM community.  Other 
suggestions were to establish a Reliability IPT, “get 
involved in the reliability program at the beginning,” and 
follow up on the reliability status on a monthly basis. 
Early, accurate requirements establishment, analysis and 
traceability and ability to influence design were also 
important.  General consensus existed for establishing 
detailed Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria to ensure 
proper assessment of tests.  It is also necessary to “test 
early and often,” and effectively analyze and correct 
failures.  For software development, a program suggested 
use of “open architecture and object oriented design” and 
use of a Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM) level 3 or higher software design 
organization. 
Common pitfalls to be avoided were varied as well.  
One program warned against establishing “unrealistic 
requirements, an unrealistic growth curve based on 
resources and time,” and poor definition of FDSC. One 
respondent indicated that a lack of communication and 
support from management must be avoided.  
7. Ultra-Reliability 
The last series of questions were meant to determine 
if ultra-reliability should be a Key Performance Parameter 
(KPP) and if it is achievable. 
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Responses were mixed regarding whether ultra-
reliability should be a KPP.  At least one respondent was 
unfamiliar with the term and would not speculate on its 
achievability or worth.   
Most programs indicated that establishing ultra-
reliability as a KPP and achieving it was dependent on the 
“system, its operating environment, and the use of 
commercial items.”  
Mechanically oriented programs were divided regarding 
ultra-reliability.  Two programs thought reliability was an 
important consideration and may be possible if enough time 
and money were invested.  Two programs indicated that 
ultra-reliability should not be a KPP for systems such as 
theirs because it is not realistic or possible for 
mechanical systems.  They stated that ultra-reliability may 
be possible for “electronics or computer software” but is 
“not realistic” for “military mechanical systems pounding 
the cross country terrain at 40 mph” and is therefore, 
unachievable without exotic materials and unrealistic 
subsystem redundancy.   
Most electronically oriented programs indicated that 
ultra-reliability should be a KPP because soldiers in the 
field need reliable systems.  One program stated that it 
should only be considered where “safety is a critical 
concern.”  They also thought that it might be achievable if 
the program had the money and time necessary to invest in 
its development. 
C.  SUMMARY 
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Seven respondents representing nine programs described 
their successful strategies and practices for achieving 
reliability requirements.  The viewpoint for the responses 
was from the perspective of the person most responsible for 
reliability within the program.  The respondents described 
their approach for organization, requirement development, 
reliability management, achievement and timeline, lessons 
learned, and thoughts on ultra-reliability.  This 
information will be analyzed in the next chapter, 
identifying trends and differences, and comparing these to 
guidance. 
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V.  DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter summarizes the analysis of the subjective 
data gathered during the interviews of the nine successful 
programs.  Responses were analyzed by subject area, 
revealing common trends and differences in comparison to 
published reliability guidance, while identifying 
advantages and disadvantages of practices. 
B. ANALYSIS OF SUBJECT AREAS 
1. Organizing for Reliability 
DA PAM 70-3 recommends organizing a Reliability 
Integrated Process Team (IPT) “to review, classify and 
charge R&M data from system level development and 
operational tests.”  Participants of the Reliability IPT 
are the Program Office or Materiel Developer (MATDEV), the 
user or Combat Developer (CBTDEV), the Training Developer 
(TNGDEV), and the independent evaluator.  It further states 
that “R&M IPTs should be held periodically during system 
level testing” with a final IPT “held at the conclusion of 
each test.” [Ref. 18:p. 103] 
Program trends support guidance to the point that a 
Reliability Availability Maintainability Working Group 
(RAMWG) was organized subordinate to the Test Integration 
Working Group (TIWG).  This group was responsible for 
developing reliability requirements and developing Failure 
Definition and Scoring Criteria (FDSC).  The TIWG was 
comprised of representatives from the test and evaluation 
community, the material developer and the user.  The TIWG 
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met quarterly initially, then monthly and bimonthly during 
tests to score test incidents. 
An advantage of this organization is that it is an 
effective way to coordinate testing for reliability.   The 
group is able to easily crosswalk reliability requirements 
to test plans and scenarios, ensuring test events are 
scheduled to measure reliability growth.  This organization 
also ensures FDSC are clearly defined.  This practice 
results in efficient scoring conferences due to the prior 
coordination, definition of failures, and familiarity with 
test events and incidents. 
A disadvantage of this organization is that the group 
may be focused more on results and on pass/fail testing 
rather than on influencing design and progressive growth to 
meet requirements.  The subordinate relationship may also 
diminish the value of the reliability group, making 
reliability seem less important than testing overall. 
The importance of reliability, relative to the 
individual primarily responsible for its achievement, also 
varied by program.  Most importantly, every program had at 
least one individual who was primarily responsible for 
reliability.  The level of responsibility varied from 
program to program.  Individual primary responsibility was 
assigned to a Reliability and Maintainability Branch Chief, 
a Reliability Engineer, or a Mechanical Engineer in each 
program.  An advantage of assigning reliability to a branch 
chief is that reliability gains greater importance and has 
a more powerful advocate.  It is also advantageous to have 
a trained and experienced Reliability Engineer supporting 
the program.  A Reliability Engineer was provided by matrix 
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support in some programs.  An advantage of matrix support 
is that the person is usually skilled because they work on 
more than one program and the overhead costs of maintaining 
that person are reduced because they are shared with the 
other programs and are not a full-time employee.  A 
disadvantage of matrix support is that the person is not 
dedicated to only one program and may be working on several 
at a time.  This may result in a lack of complete 
familiarity with the program that a dedicated program 
professional may have. 
2. Reliability Requirement 
AR 70-1 states: “MATDEVs are to participate in the 
combat or training developer efforts to establish R&M and 
other system requirements.” [Ref. 16:p. 18] DA PAM 70-3 
states requirements are determined using the “IPT process… 
[and] reflect what the MATDEV deems affordable and 
technically achievable with program funding, risk, and time 
constraints.” [Ref. 18:p. 99] 
Program processes are in accordance with documented 
guidance.  In all programs, a program reliability 
representative was able to provide input for establishing 
reliability requirements and helped create the RAM 
Rationale Report.  The reliability representatives analyzed 
and adjusted the user’s need considering industrial 
technological capability. 
Advantages of including the program reliability 
representative in the requirements development process is 
that the program representative is brought into the system 
lifecycle at origination and made to feel a member of the 
team.  The representative also better understands the 
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requirements and the need supporting the requirements.  The 
program representative also provides essential industrial 
capability information that supports the achievability of 
requirements.  A disadvantage of this process is that it is 
possible that requirements that exceed industrial 
capability may be reduced, instead of remaining as an 
objective to induce industry to achieve and surpass 
expectations, realizing their full potential. 
In developing reliability requirements, all programs 
used historical data from similar previous systems as a 
basis for system reliability, adjusted for technological 
improvements.  For components, reliability requirements 
were developed using three methods.  The first method 
leverages similar component reliability from other 
programs.  The second method uses data from the Rome 
Analysis Center’s, Reliability Engineer’s Toolkit. The 
third method was to uses manufacturer’s specifications.  
Historical information and reliability handbook data 
can be an excellent source for determining reliability 
requirements.  There is no better source of information 
than actual performance measurement of similar fielded 
systems.  Care must be taken when adjusting for 
technological differences because arguments can be made 
justifying an increase or decrease in reliability.  As 
identified in the modern tractor example in Chapter 2, 
modern systems are usually more complex in design, which 
may reduce reliability.  However, technological improvement 
of components can also increase reliability, as the 
reliability improvements are made to a proven component or 
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mechanical systems are replaced by more reliable electronic 
systems. 
Using a manufacturer’s specifications for reliability 
requirements is not always an effective method for 
estimating reliability in military applications.  
Manufacturers may make claims as to the reliability of 
their systems, but unless their systems are proven through 
independent testing or through analysis of field data, 
claims should be considered unsubstantiated until tested.  
Manufacturers may also develop specifications from faulty 
analysis or by using prediction methods for systems 
unintended for military tactical use.  This is demonstrated 
in the table below, which compares one system’s reliability 
predictions by manufacturers, with MIL-STD-217 predictions 
for that same system.  This comparison resulted in the 
Government’s insistence that MIL-STD-217 not be used as a 
predictor because of its inaccuracy for field data. 
Model Predicted Failures Per 
Million Hours 
Bell Communications Research 12,502 
MIL-HDBK-217 715,784 
British Telecom 1,258 
CNET (French) 16,714 
Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph 
9,525 
Note: “MIL-HDBK 217 is not intended to predict field 
reliability and, in general, does not do a very good job in 
an absolute sense.  The reasons for this are numerous 
including different failure definitions for field problems 
that MIL-HDBK-217 does not account for…” RAC Technical 
Brief, April 1990 
Table 6.   Reliability Prediction Comparison [From Ref. 7:p. 
10-15]  
AR 70-1 states: “Contract R&M requirements should 
reflect operational R&M requirements in the ORD or reflect 
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technical values derived from them.” [Ref. 16:p. 100] 
Programs followed this guidance in translating reliability 
requirements, outlined in contract performance 
specifications, for the contractor.  In only two programs, 
reliability requirements varied from those in the ORD.  For 
those two programs, ORD operational reliability 
requirements expressed in terms of Mean Miles Between 
Operational Mission Failure (MMBOMF) were translated into 
hardware reliability requirements expressed in terms of 
Mean Miles Between Hardware Mission Failure (MMBHMF).  
Requirements translation was accomplished by multiplying 
the MMBOMF requirement by 1.33, a widely accepted 
acceleration, to arrive at the MMBHMF requirement.  This 
translation was done so that the contractor would 
understand the system reliability requirement independent 
of operator or maintainer induced failures, and would be 
responsible for system reliability at the accelerated rate.  
Using a hardware reliability requirement is acceptable for 
developmental testing, but during operational testing, the 
operational reliability requirement must be used.  If 
hardware reliability requirements, instead of operational 
reliability requirements, were used during operational 
testing, the contractor could not be held responsible for 
operator or maintainer induced failures as a result of 
complex operating, doctrine or maintenance procedures.  The 
only caution is that a sufficient margin of error must be 
allowed in translating operational reliability requirements 
to hardware requirements.  Additionally, the contractor 
must be aware of the operational requirement and use Early 
or Limited User Tests during developmental testing to 
achieve this with the system design.   
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To manage reliability and increase visibility, 
requirements were also included in the Acquisition Program 
Baseline and Milestone III Exit Criteria.  Including 
requirements in the Milestone III Exit Criteria ensured the 
Milestone Decision Authority would not approve the system 
for production or fielding without achieving requirements.   
3. Reliability Management 
AR 70-1 states: “The MATDEV is responsible for 
development and implementation of an effective R&M 
program….”  ”This applies to all developmental programs and 
non-developmental item (NDI) programs, other than 
commercial programs….” [Ref. 16:p. 18]  
As a result of specification reform, programs are 
prevented from specifying to contractors “how to” design, 
manufacture, or test for reliability.  To maintain 
visibility of reliability achievement over contractors, 
programs used a variety of methods.   
Reviews were one method used to maintain visibility 
over reliability achievement. A Corrective Action 
Management Review (CAMR) consisting of both contractor and 
program representatives worked with “Tiger Teams” of 
contractor representatives that conducted root cause 
analysis of failures. 
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Two programs began development prior to specification 
reform and, for one of these programs, it was stated as the 
reason the program succeeded in achieving reliability 
requirements.  Three programs had Reliability Program Plans 
prepared for the program office, while two other programs 
had plans prepared that the contractor followed.  Four 
programs stated that Reliability Program Plans were 
unnecessary because of the limited developmental nature of 
the program. 
Although these programs were successful in achieving 
their reliability requirements, they jeopardized their 
success by not using a Reliability Program Plan.  Guidance 
specifies that implementation of an R&M plan is required 
for all programs, regardless of their nature.  There have 
been many programs which were thought to be non-
developmental or only requiring integration of proven 
components that instead, proved to be very difficult in 
achieving reliability thresholds. 
Primary sources of reliability guidance according to 
respondents, consisted of both canceled and current 
publications.  Publications cited included AR 702-3, Army 
Materiel Systems Reliability, Availability, and 
Maintainability (RAM), and AR 70-1, Army Acquisition 
Policy, which superseded the currently canceled AR 702-3.  
Another essential publication included TRADOC Pamphlet 70-
11, RAM Rationale Handbook, which was also canceled.  Cited 
publications governing reliability achievement included the 
once mandatory MIL-STD-781 and the discretionary 
publication that superseded it, MIL-HDBK-781A, Reliability 
Testing for Engineering Development, Qualification, and 
Production.  Additional popular publications were MIL-HDBK-
189, Reliability Growth Management, and MIL-STD-1629, 
Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis, which was canceled.  According to 
respondents, many programs still used canceled or 
superseded Government guidance by transforming that 
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guidance into performance specifications or directives in 
the Statement of Work (SOW). 
The cancellation of these sources of guidance was 
primarily due to acquisition and specification reform.  A 
program’s inability to specify standards that must be 
complied with for design, manufacture, or test for 
reliability can be challenging.  With few exceptions, 
military programs are not allowed to specify standards and 
task description numbers in contractor’s statements of 
work.  Military standards and specifications that were once 
mandatory were changed to discretionary handbooks as a 
result of changes made by Government specification reform.  
These handbooks all have the same forward that states they 
“cannot be cited as a requirement.  If it is, the 
contractor does not have to comply.”  These changes were 
made to allow industry to use commercial standards and 
specifications instead of stringent Government standards, 
which were considered as cost drivers and unnecessary.   
However, with the cancellation of many military 
specifications, there is still a void in commercial 
specifications as some are still awaiting publication.  A 
commercial standard replacement for MIL-STD-785B, 
Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment Development 
and Production, canceled August 1998, is still awaiting 
publication by IEEE.  This is just one example of this 
problem.  An Internet search for reliability standards and 
specifications, commercial or otherwise, returns more hits 
for military standards than any other, even though many 
have been canceled.  It is apparent that commercial 
industry still looks to the military for providing this 
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guidance.  Another problem with commercial standards and 
specifications is that many are applicable only for use in 
commercial environments, not demanding military tactical 
environments.  Military deployments can subject a system to 
all of the world’s temperature or humidity extremes, not to 
mention dust, vibration and shock. 
4. Reliability Achievement 
Reliability was designated as a Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) for one program while another stated it was 
more important than a KPP and received general officer 
visibility.  All programs agreed that reliability was an 
important performance parameter. 
Although it may not be necessary to designate 
reliability as a KPP to successfully achieve reliability 
requirements, it is necessary to recognize and convey to 
the contractor the importance of reliability and enforce 
its achievement.  Designating reliability as a KPP would 
help protect it from trade-offs for seemingly more 
important considerations such as performance 
characteristics or decreased initial costs.  Only recently 
have program managers been encouraged to consider system 
lifecycle costs instead of initial cost that might have 
permitted buy-ins (inexpensive initial costs with 
extraordinary operations and support costs). 
AR 70-1 states “assessment of R&M in accordance with 
the FDSC will be an objective in every system level test 
(technical, operational and production).” [Ref. 16:p. 100]  
AR 70-1 further states: “A R&M IPT will be held to review, 
classify and charge test data from system level tests 
planned for assessment of R&M requirements.” [Ref. 16:p. 
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100]  Adherence to this guidance was one reason given for 
program success.  Programs attributed success to early 
establishment and updating of Failure Definition and 
Scoring Criteria, well-managed scoring conferences and 
funded and continuous tests.  Failure Definition Scoring 
Criteria (FDSC) must be clearly defined with consideration 
of all possible failure scenarios.  Failures must be 
defined with regard to criticality and what constitutes a 
failure. 
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AR 70-1 states: “MATDEVs are to plan for and manage 
system R&M development and are encouraged to utilize 
reliability growth planning tools.” [Ref. 16:p. 99]  Some 
programs implemented this guidance by establishing a 
database for tracking failures and root cause analyses.  
Reliability growth tools used by programs included Failure 
Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Test-
Analyze-Fix-Test (TAFT), fishbone cause and effect, Failure 
Reporting and Corrective Action System (FRACAS), and 
component level Environmental Stress Screening (ESS), 
Highly Accelerated Life Testing (HALT) and Highly 
Accelerated Stress Testing (HAST).  Although these are all 
good reliability growth tools that work to identify causes 
for failure, these tools are primarily reactive to failures 
instead of being proactive, and working to prevent 
failures.  One tool, FMECA, does attempt to influence 
design by analyzing potential system failures.  No programs 
indicated the use of Physics of Failure (PoF), a 
reliability design tool that uses Modeling & Simulation 
(M&S) to “identify first-order failure mechanisms prior to 
physical testing.” [Ref. 4:p. 10-16]  One program stated 
that it “didn’t work to influence design” because it was 
merely integrating non-developmental items.  Reactive tools 
may be effective when used in this situation, but 
developmental programs cannot wait until after the design 
is established to measure reliability and could benefit 
from use of a predictive modeling tool to evaluate trade-
offs and assist in design. 
Incentivizing a contractor can be effective for 
achieving and exceeding reliability requirements.  However, 
only two programs incentivized their contractor for 
troublesome components.  Others stated that there was no 
need to do this because the contractor knew what had to be 
done and continuing the program was incentive enough. 
Regarding reliability sustainment after fielding, one 
program hadn’t thought about it and stated that the 
logisticians were primarily concerned with that.  Other 
programs planned on using service representatives and 
review boards to identify and correct failures.  Another 
program would use Deficiency Product Reports (DPR) and 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS).  One last program 
thought the Army could do a better job of tracking parts 
and system reliability to better improve faulty components. 
The comment by one program Reliability Engineer that 
it hadn’t considered reliability after fielding and it was 
the responsibility of the logisticians is disconcerting.  
This comment is equivalent to a asking a production line 
worker “Who is responsible for Quality Assurance/Control?” 
and getting the response, “They are, down there.”  
Reliability at all stages should be a concern of everyone 
within the program.  Logisticians, as well as Reliability 
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Engineers, should be concerned with it from the beginning 
to effectively plan for support.   
5. Reliability Timeline 
All programs agreed that it is necessary to focus on 
reliability early in the lifecycle.  Helping to establish 
reliability requirements that are “agreed to and understood 
by all” is one of the most important steps in the process.  
These reliability requirements can mean success or failure 
for a program.  If requirements aren’t considered to be 
optimal for all stakeholders, then there is a chance that 
“requirements creep” can occur.  This creep or change of 
requirements can cause a program to spend additional time 
or money in attempts to meet increasing requirements, or to 
needlessly spend time and money trying to achieve a 
requirement that is later deemed unrealistic and then 
reduced.   
The next important step is to establish Failure 
Definition and Scoring Criteria (FDSC) that are easily 
interpreted and understood by all.  If FDSC do not clearly 
outline what constitutes a failure, much time can be spent 
arguing for one interpretation or another.  Failure 
definitions are prepared for all possible eventualities to 
ensure that failures are recognized and properly scored.  
In designing the system, it is important to influence 
the design to increase reliability by using a design 
analysis tool such as PoF.  Poorly planned designs can 
greatly increase system lifecycle costs.  This is because 
once a design is established, future program costs are 
often more than 70% established.  [Ref. 4:p. 12-5] 
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Last is the test-analyze-fix-test (TAFT) process.  
This process tests the component or system, analyzes 
failures, fixes the failures and retests to ensure the 
failure was corrected and other failures didn’t occur as a 
result of the fix.  Testing is an important step and must 
occur throughout the system’s lifecycle.  Developmental 
testing is important to reduce risk and confirm 
specifications.  Operational tests determine if the system 
is operationally effective and suitable. 
6. Ultra-reliability 
Most survey respondents were unfamiliar with the term 
ultra-reliability or had no experience in attempts to 
achieve it.  Respondents did agree that designating ultra-
reliability as a KPP depended on its achievability and on 
the system, the operating environment, and use of 
commercial items.  Mechanical systems programs believed 
that ultra-reliability goals were unachievable for their 
systems due to the demanding operating environment.  
Electronic system programs believed it was achievable if 
sufficient time and money were available.  
Ultra-reliability is considered a means for reducing 
the logistics burden and decreasing lifecycle costs, but 
the recommendation for designating ultra-reliability as a 
KPP met resistance from some high ranking Army officials 
who argued that it was too soon in the lifecycle to do 
this, and it would also reduce trade space.  If ultra-
reliability is not established as a KPP at the start of the 
program, then later might be too late to try to achieve it 
due to the necessity to design in ultra-reliability from 
the beginning.  “Key trade-offs between [components]… and 
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design layout occur early in a program and can 
significantly impact the reliability and lifecycle costs of 
a system.” [Ref. 31]  
Modeling and Simulation tools, such as Physics of 
Failure, exist for development of systems with ultra-
reliability and some systems, such as the Space Shuttle, 
are working to achieve it.  It’s true that it requires a 
substantial initial investment, however, the benefits, such 
as reduced O&S costs and lives saved, will make a valuable 
but intangible return on the initial investment many times 
over. 
C. SUMMARY 
Analysis of the interview data shows that there are 
many successful practices and strategies in use.  Some of 
these practices support documented guidance, while others 
are independent of guidance.   
Successful programs treated reliability as an 
important goal and enjoyed the support of management.  They 
were sure to focus on reliability from the beginning and 
continued to mature it through definition of requirements, 
measures, analysis, and testing, fixing and retesting. 
Programs identified that tracking reliability for 
fielded systems and components for their own use as well as 
other programs using similar components and systems could 
be improved.  Programs also stated that the Government must 
reinstate or publish more mandatory reliability guidance to 
better manage its achievement. 
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As for ultra-reliability, most mechanical programs 
believed it wasn’t applicable to their types of systems and 
wouldn’t be achievable without an extraordinary investment 
of time and money.  Electronic programs thought it could be 
achieved, but should only be considered for safety critical 




VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Because only 20% of Army weapon system programs meet 
reliability requirements, it is essential to capture 
successful strategies and practices.  Analysis of the 
subjective questionnaire data gathered and presented in the 
previous chapter reveals many interesting practices used by 
the few successful programs to achieve reliability 
requirements.  In this chapter, conclusions are drawn 
regarding successful practices and recommendations are made 
for implementation of these practices for programs 
attempting to achieve reliability requirements. 
B. RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Preliminary research questions are addressed here with 
a short summary of the answer. 
• What is reliability and how does it affect total 
life cycle costs and the logistics burden? 
Reliability is “the probability that an item will 
perform its intended function for a specified interval 
under stated conditions.” [Ref. 2:p. 36]  Generally, 
reliability is most often modeled as an exponential 
distribution that is a function of MTBF and time, and as 
time increases, reliability decreases.  
An investment of one dollar in reliability was proven 
to decrease lifecycle costs by eight dollars in one case 
and five dollars in another case.  With this savings, funds 
may be redirected to more pressing needs such as 
modernizing the force or quality of life improvement.  
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Reliability has the effect of reducing the logistics 
burden.  More reliable systems require less spares and 
maintenance, reducing the logistics footprint on the 
battlefield. 
• What is ultra-reliability and why is this a 
recommended goal of FCS? 
Ultra-reliability is recognized as an extremely high 
level of reliability, however, there is no standard 
numerical reliability figure or definition associated with 
it.  The National Aeronautic Space Administration (NASA) 
refers to ultra-reliability in software as having a failure 
probability during a one-hour test mission of less than 
0.0000001.  This means that the software will not fail 
99.99999% of the time. [Ref. 4] 
The Army Science Board recommended that ultra-
reliability be a goal of the FCS because it will reduce the 
logistics burden by decreasing the number of maintenance 
personnel, equipment, and spares required for support.  
Some estimates indicate that ultra-reliability can reduce 
service and support personnel requirements in the Objective 
Force Area of Operations by as much as 83%. [Ref. 12] 
• What is the guidance for achieving reliability 
requirements? 
Both mandatory and discretionary guidance exists for 
the achievement of reliability requirements, but, because 
of acquisition reform, there is not as much mandatory 
guidance as there once was. 
Limited mandatory guidance for achieving reliability 
requirements for all services is provided in DoDD 5000.1 
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and DoD 5000.2-R.  Army specific mandatory guidance is 
found in both AR 70-1 and AR 71-9.   
There are many discretionary sources of reliability 
guidance in addition to the mandatory guidance.  
Discretionary sources consist mostly of Department of the 
Army Pamphlets and Military Handbooks.  Some of the most 
important and management relevant guidance is found in DA-
PAM 70-3 which devotes an entire section to Reliability, 
Maintainability and Availability.  There are also several 
military handbooks addressing reliability including MIL-
HDBK-781A and MIL-HDBK-189.  
There is not as much regulatory guidance as there had 
been in the past.  Many mandatory standards and 
specifications have been canceled or made discretionary as 
a result of acquisition reform in the interest of 
eliminating cost drivers and giving preference to 
commercial standards over military standards. 
C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The primary research question of this thesis is:   
What strategies should be used to achieve reliability 
requirements for weapon system development? 
1. Strategies of Successful Programs 
Secondary research questions supporting this question 
focused on: 
How have successful weapon system programs achieved 
reliability requirements? 
To answer this question, nine successful programs were 
questioned regarding their practices. 
a. Organizing for Reliability 
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How did programs organize to achieve reliability 
requirements? 
Conclusion:  Most programs organized Reliability 
Working Groups subordinately to the Test Integrated Working 
Group (TIWG).  A person primarily designated for 
reliability, usually a Reliability Engineer, represented 
the program in the groups. 
Recommendation:  Programs should organize a 
Reliability Integrated Process Team to identify, solve, and 
manage reliability issues.  Instead of working 
subordinately for the TIWG, this group should have 
equivalent authority, while also working with the TIWG to 
coordinate testing. 
b. Requirements Development  
How were reliability requirements developed? 
Conclusion:  Reliability requirements were 
developed with input from both the user and program 
reliability representative based upon need, industrial 
capability, technological advancements, and historical 
information.  The collection of historical information for 
use by programs should be vastly improved.  When defining 
reliability requirements, only one program designated it as 
a Key Performance Parameter (KPP), but all other programs 
treated reliability as an important objective.  
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Recommendation: Programs should develop a 
Reliability, Availability & Maintainability (RAM) Rationale 
Report using an Integrated Product Team (IPT) process based 
upon historical information for similar systems and 
components with consideration given to industrial 
capability and technological improvements.  To prevent the 
possibility of requirements being reduced due to a lack of 
technological capability, the requirement should remain as 
the objective with the technological capability as the 
threshold.  The contractor could then be incentivized to 
achieve the objective requirement. 
The Standard Army Maintenance System and 
maintenance practices should be modified to enable the 
collection of reliability data for components as well as 
systems.  Pertinent necessary information, at a minimum, 
that should be collected includes hours or miles operated.  
For depot level reparables, an analysis of the reason for 
failure, performed by the repair technician, should also 
complement the operating time.  The collected information 
could then be provided to the program office to design 
decisions impacting reliability issues. 
Programs should also designate reliability as a 
KPP for programs that are electronic in nature and where 
safety or system criticality is a primary concern.  If 
reliability is given the same weight as performance, cost, 
and other factors during the trade-off process, it should 
not be unnecessarily sacrificed. 
c. Reliability Management Plans 
What management plans for achieving reliability 
requirements were developed and implemented? 
Conclusion:  Most programs did not have 
Reliability Program Plans because of the limited 
developmental nature of their systems.  Programs managed 
reliability achievement through RIWGs that analyzed and 
scored test data.  Teams of contractor and program 
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representatives conducted root cause analysis to identify 
and correct failures.  
Recommendation:  Programs, especially 
developmental ones, should develop and implement 
Reliability Program Plans to effectively manage reliability 
achievement.  Key aspects of the Reliability Program Plan 
should be: organizational responsibilities; requirements 
development; Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria; use 
of design tools such as Physics of Failure; test plans; 
root cause analysis methods; and incentivizing for 
achievement.   
d. Reliability Achievement 
What processes were used to achieve reliability 
requirements and how was this measured? 
Conclusion:  Primarily, a test-analyze-fix-test 
process, which encourages reliability growth, was used to 
achieve reliability requirements.  Reliability requirements 
were measured and analyzed during developmental testing.  
Many programs didn’t attempt to design in reliability prior 
to testing because they were not developmental programs.  
Developmental programs would benefit from a design analysis 
tool such as Physics of Failure to develop the optimal 
design prior to commitment of funds for an unproven design.  
Non-Developmental Item (NDI) programs with significant 
integration challenges could benefit as well. 
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Contractors were incentivized to achieve 
reliability requirements for troublesome components.  It is 
not necessary to incentivize a contractor for the entire 
system, as this could be very costly.  Nor should a 
contractor be incentivized from the start, as it would be 
difficult to determine what the most troublesome components 
would be and to determine how much of an incentive should 
be used. 
Reliability Engineers must be concerned with 
reliability throughout the system’s life instead of just 
focusing on “getting through testing.”  Reliability 
Engineers must work with and assist logisticians, even 
after the system is fielded.  This should be a result of 
the Reliability IPT process, instead of compartmentalized 
planning and development. 
Recommendation:  Programs should use many 
iterations of developmental testing to measure and “grow” 
reliability using the test-analyze-fix-test process.  
Programs should also use Physics of Failure to design in 
reliability prior to testing to reduce the number of costly 
iterations.  Incentives should be focused on troublesome 
components, rewarding the contractor when requirements are 
exceeded.  Reliability Engineers should work closely with 
logisticians as part of an IPT, to better coordinate 
logistics planning and influence reliability after 
fielding. 
e. Reliability Timeline 
Where in the Acquisition Process was the program 
focused on achievement of reliability requirements? 
Conclusion:  All programs agreed that reliability 
must be a key focus from the start of the program.  It’s 
important to first define reliability requirements that are 
acceptable to both the user and program, define Failure 
Definition and Scoring Criteria (FDSC) to allocate failures 
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and score them, and to use an iterative test-analyze-fix-
test process to achieve reliability growth. 
Recommendation:  Programs must focus on 
reliability early in the lifecycle before final development 
of the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). 
2. Ultra-reliability 
Should ultra-reliability be a goal of weapon system 
programs? 
Conclusion:  Most programs agreed that ultra-
reliability is a difficult objective to achieve because of 
the immense investment of time and money.  
Recommendation:  Ultra-reliability should only be 
implemented in those programs where a cost-benefit analysis 
demonstrates that the benefits of achieving this difficult 
objective outweigh the costs.  Consideration must be given 
to the technological risk and should only be pursued for 
electronics systems or critical safety related items. 
3. Application of Successful Strategies 
What are the best strategies that should be used for 
the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program as well as other 
weapon system programs? 
Conclusion:  The FCS is a program that could be 
compared to a combination of the previously discussed 
programs.  It has elements of each of these programs in 
that it is a program, in the developmental stage, relying 
heavily on mechanical, electrical, and software systems. 
Recommendation: The FCS program, as well as other 
programs, should implement the previous recommendations to 
achieve reliability requirements. 
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D. LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Much can be learned from successful programs.  The 
Acquisition Logistics Guide outlines many successful 
reliability practices used by organizations in its 
Reliability and Maintainability chapter.  Interviewed 
programs also made good recommendations for changing steps 
and processes concerning reliability achievement.   
AR 70-1 states: “MATDEVs are to track fielded systems 
failure and repair histories starting at First Unit 
Equipped (FUE).” [Ref. 16:p. 99]  One program stated that 
this could be improved upon.  A recommendation made for 
process improvement was for the Army maintenance system to 
be held responsible for collecting reliability failure data 
for components in service.  The benefits of this 
recommendation are that the programs responsible for these 
systems and components would gain better visibility of 
failures, their causes, and recommendations for 
improvement.    Other programs could also benefit by having 
field reliability data that could be used for comparison, 
estimation of future requirements, and even selection of 
contractors and components.  Currently, programs only have 
visibility of parts requirements or demand trends without 
knowing the length of time the part operated, operating 
conditions, and reasons for failure.  LARs at the 
installation level may sometimes investigate and report 
failure trends identified in the field.  If programs are 
notified or aware of failures, they may also investigate 
causes and if correctable, initiate engineering change 
proposals.  Reliability Centered Maintenance programs have 
also been used to develop a scheduled maintenance program 
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to identify and prevent failures by replacing parts before 
it affects system readiness.  
Programs also stated that there was not enough 
guidance concerning reliability management and achievement.  
They thought that the Government had gone too far in 
canceling many military specifications and standards and 
that some should be reinstated. 
Another idea by one program for a process change would 
be to allow “participation of the system contractor” in 
operational testing.  Law prohibits contractors from 
participating in operational testing to prevent them from 
taking measures to ensure the system passes.  The reason 
for this is to ensure they don’t try to step in to correct 
failures or other problems prior to completion of the test, 
altering the test conditions, and preventing a true measure 
of the system’s performance.  However, one program found 
that contractors could observe problems during testing as 
they occurred without making corrections, so that they 
better understood the problems and failures and their 
ramifications.  By doing this, contractors knew what 
changes to make to allow the system to successfully 
complete testing at a later date. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The scope of this thesis dealt only with successful 
Army programs that had recently and successfully completed 
testing with respect to reliability.  This researcher did 
not consider other services or civilian organizations 
because the researcher was primarily interested in Army 
programs and the environment in which they operated. 
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Recommendations for further study include: 
1.  A comparison of the practices of the Army with 
other services and civilian organizations in achieving 
reliability requirements. 
2.  A study of the methods that the National 
Aeronautic Space Administration uses to achieve reliability 
requirements, focusing especially on ultra-reliability. 
3.  The perspective of the civilian contractor 
counterpart in achieving reliability requirements. 
4.  A study comparing reliability predictions, 
measurements from testing, and actual field data to 
determine the effectiveness of the predictions and testing. 
F. THESIS SUMMARY 
Reducing the logistics burden is a current focus for 
the Army as it works to develop and field the Objective 
Force.  Increasing reliability is a key method of achieving 
this goal, with an added benefit of reducing O&S costs. 
Many programs are struggling to achieve even half of 
their established reliability requirement.  Therefore, we 
should look to successful programs to show us the way in 
achieving requirements.  If we are unsuccessful in our 
endeavors, future forces will be unnecessarily burdened by 
our mistakes and incapable of progress. 
The Army aviation community is currently experiencing 
the effects of attempting to manage this problem by 
maintaining an aging fleet.  COL Stephen Mundt, aviation 
director in the office of the Army’s deputy chief of staff 
for programs concluded “maintenance and readiness issues in 
our aviation fleet render our current aviation force 
unaffordable.” [Ref. 32] Further, the aviation branch is 
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questioning its ability to support the future Objective 
Force because of modernization difficulties as a result of 
budget limitations. 
If we are to transition to and field an effective 
Objective Force and other future forces, we must be 
successful in improving reliability in systems under 
development.  Otherwise, our mistakes will degrade our 




APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW SUBJECT QUESTIONNAIRE 
This appendix contains a copy of the interview 
questionnaire that was administered to the study subjects. 
  






Life Cycle Phase of Program: 
Program ACAT Level: 
Date of OT:  
 
1.  Organizing for Reliability 
a.  How was your program organized for reliability (e.g., 
was there a reliability IPT, who was represented, what was 
their purpose, and how often did you meet)?  
 
b.  Who within the program was primarily responsible for 
reliability (e.g., was there one person or more and what 
was their job title and job description)? 
 
2.  Requirement Development 
a.  How much, if any input did you have in establishing 
reliability requirements? 
 
b.  How were reliability requirements determined (e.g., 
were they based on historical information, derived goals, 
or another method)? 
 
c.  What was your requirement for reliability, how was it 
worded by both the user and to the contractor, and in what 
documents was it specified to the contractor? 
 
3.  Reliability Management 
a.  Because AR 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy, directs that 
solicitations should not specify ‘how to’ design, 
manufacture or test for reliability, how did the contractor 
manage reliability growth and achievement and what 
oversight did you have over the contractor’s methods. 
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b.  Did you have a Reliability Program Plan, and if so, did 
you use a documented template, and what were its key 
elements? 
 
c.  How much of the plan did you follow?  Did you vary your 
approach? 
 
d.  What were your primary sources of reliability guidance 
and do you feel that there is adequate amount of guidance 
regarding reliability, why or why not? 
 
4.  Reliability Achievement 
a.  Was your reliability requirement a Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) and if not, how much emphasis did its 
achievement receive? 
 
b.  What reliability did you actually achieve? 
 
c.  How would you rate your program’s achievement of 
reliability requirements (extremely successful, moderately 
successful, or average) and why do you rate yourself at 
that level? 
 
d.  To what do you attribute your success, and did you do 
something that you feel is innovative or extraordinary? 
 
e.  What design analysis tools or process did you primarily 
use, and why, for failure root cause analysis? 
 
f.  What role did testing play in achieving reliability 
requirements and how much and what types were conducted? 
 
g.  When comparing the reliability figure measured in 
Operational Testing to that from Developmental Testing or 
estimates, roughly what percent of an increase or decrease 
was experienced and to what do you attribute the change? 
 
h.  What were the key sources of unreliability (i.e. was it 
hardware or software, what was its function, and why was it 
so troublesome)? 
 
i.  Did you incentivize the contractor in any way to 
achieve reliability requirements, why or why not? 
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j.  How do you plan to continue to maintain the system’s 
reliability over time after fielding? 
 
5.  Reliability Timeline 
a.  When did you begin focusing on reliability (i.e., at 
what phase or step in the acquisition life cycle) and why 
was it important to be involved at that time)? 
 
b.  What are some of the most important steps by phase 
affecting reliability in the acquisition life cycle that 
must be accomplished? 
 
6.  Lessons Learned/Recommendations for Improvement 
a.  If you had the power to change any step, requirement, 
or process for reliability achievement, what would you 
change and why? 
 
b.  What are some suggestions that you would like to pass 
to any program attempting to achieve requirements? (Please 
provide at least three) 
 
c.  What are some of the common pitfalls to be avoided? 
 
7.  Ultra-Reliability 
a.  Should ultra-reliability be a KPP for weapon system 
programs, why or why not? 
 
b.  Is ultra-reliability achievable in the current 













































APPENDIX B. LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
Dear Sir: 
 
Your program was identified by ATEC as an exemplary 
organization for the achievement of reliability 
requirements as measured by Operational Testing. 
 
I am completing my Master degree thesis at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.  The title of my 
thesis is, “Successful Strategies for Achieving Reliability 
Requirements in Weapon Systems Acquisition.”  I expect to 
graduate in March, so time is of the essence in gathering 
my data. 
 
Therefore, I am conducting a survey regarding your 
successful achievement of reliability requirements to 
explore your command/agency’s strategies and methodology.  
Because you are one of only five exemplary programs, it is 
essential that you are as detailed as possible when 
answering the questions to fully capture your strategies.   
 
My seven areas of interest concern: 1) organization; 
2) requirements development; 3) reliability management; 4) 
measures of achievement; 5) where in the acquisition 
lifecycle you focused your efforts; 6) lessons learned; and 
7) your thoughts on ultra-reliability.  I believe that many 
programs could benefit from your practices, as many are 
struggling with achievement of reliability requirements. 
 
Please respond to the attached questionnaire by 
opening it, filling in responses after each question, and 
saving it, then attaching it to an email and return it by 
Friday, February 22.  If you have any questions regarding 
the questionnaire, please email me.  If you would prefer to 
conduct a telephonic interview using the provided 
questions, I would be happy to give you a call in the next 
week at your convenience.  Please let me know when I should 
call by emailing me at jmthorne@nps.navy.mil 




I will summarize all input responses in the analysis 
of data.  If you desire, I can forward a finished copy of 
my findings.   
 






CPT Jim Thorne 
Army Acquisition Corps 
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